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Abstract Group decision making has been widely stud-
ied since group decision making processes are very com-
mon in many fields. Formal representation of the ex-
perts’ opinions, aggregation of assessments or selection
of the best alternatives have been some of main areas
addressed by scientists and researchers. In this paper,
we focus on another promising area, the study of group
decision making processes from the concept of influ-
ence and social networks. In order to do so, we present
a novel model that gathers the experts’ initial opinions
and provides a framework to represent the influence of
a given expert over the other(s). With this proposal it
is feasible to estimate both the evolution of the group
decision making process and the final solution before
carrying out the group discussion process and conse-
quently foreseeing possible actions.
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1 Introduction
Decision making can be defined as a set of activities
whose aim is to find satisfactory solutions for a given
problem. This problem usually involves the analysis of
a finite set of alternatives. From this analysis, decision
makers, judges or expert(s) should decide which of the
alternatives is the best one to solve an issue. Decision
making can be approached from two points of view:
– Individual decision making: in which an expert must
provide the best alternative from a set of possible
solution, either evaluating the utility of each alter-
native or assessing a set of criteria that described
them.
– Group decision making: in which a group of experts
must reach a solution to a given problem.
Although decision making has been widely stud-
ied, only a few areas have drawn the attention of re-
searchers. For instance, the formal representation of the
experts’ opinions [20,21,23,34,39,41,42], the aggrega-
tion of the information [33,38] and, the selection of the
best alternative(s) [4,28] have been developed in depth
by many authors.
Another promising field is the consensus in decision
making problems [2,5,6,11,16,19,25,26]. In this kind of
problems, the aim is to reach a given course of action
that the majority of experts approve and that the mi-
nority agree to consent. In such a way, we avoid that
the minority feel that their opinions are not taken into
account.
In this paper, we focus on another interesting area
related to group decision making. We present a model
based on ‘influence’ concept that let us estimate both
the evolution of the group decision making process and
the final solution from the experts’ initial opinions.
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The utility of this field is propitious since on the one
hand, we can predict beforehand the final decision of a
given problem and, on the other hand, this model will
let us know how the opinion of one expert affects their
partners’ opinions throughout the process.
Few papers have dealt with the modeling of influ-
ences between people through discussion and exchanges
of opinions [14,15] and our aim is to apply these studies
to group decision making processes.
A Group Decision Making (GDM) process usually
entails an activity in which experts interact with each
other in order to reach a final solution. These inter-
actions consist of an exchange of opinions and infor-
mation. Because of these interactions, experts with a
wider background, experience and knowledge will be
recognized and empowered with a higher status. It is
very interesting to notice that this status reflects the
influence of a given expert over the other(s), and there-
fore, if we know the experts’ initial opinions, if we find a
suitable representation for the influence among experts
and if we gather this information, we may be able to
predict both the evolution of the experts’ opinions and
their final decisions. In order to represent this influence
network we propose the use of so-called social network
analysis.
Social network analysis [37,43] studies relationships
among social entities or actors as well as patterns and
implications of these relationships. These relationships
may be of many sorts: economic, political, interactional,
affective, etc. Social network analysis is based on the
idea that actors and their actions are interdependent
and the network structural environment provides op-
portunities for or constraints on individual actions.
Using social network analysis in GDM problems can
produce important benefits since it allows us to model
and study the relationship between experts, and there-
fore, infer or estimate the influence among themselves.
The aim of this paper is to model this situation.
The structure of this paper is the following: First
of all, in section 2 we review some preliminaries, then
the model is presented in section 3. Finally, section 4
shows an example and the conclusions are pointed out
in section 5.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we sum up some aspects needed to un-
derstand our proposal such as group decision making,
consistency and social influence networks theory.
2.1 Group Decision Making
In Group Decision Making problems (GDM), a group
of experts must decide which alternative(s) is the best
one to deal with an issue. For this reason, each one
of them provides an assessment of every possible alter-
native. To represent these judgements, some structures
are proposed. The most common ones are:
– A preference ordering of alternatives [38]: in this
case, experts provide their preferences on a set of al-
ternatives as an ordered vector of alternatives, from
the best one to the worst one.
– Utility vectors [23,41]: with this representation ex-
perts provide their preferences as a set of utility val-
ues for each alternative. The greater the value is, the
more preferred the alternative is.
– Preference relations [18,20,21,39]: based on the idea
of pairwise comparisons, experts’ preferences are de-
scribed by means of preference relations in which
each value represents the preference of one alterna-
tive over the other.
Once experts have provided their opinion, we must
accomplish the selection of the best alternatives. This
process usually involves two phases [1,32,35,44]:
– An aggregation phase: in this step, experts’ opinions
are aggregated to obtain a global opinion.
– A selection phase: in this phase the best alterna-
tive(s) is chosen and presented as the decision mak-
ing solution.
One of the most used preference structure in GDM
is the preference relation. In preference relations, we
find two kind of interpretation regarding preference as-
sessments, it can be additive reciprocal and multiplica-
tive reciprocal. In this contribution, we have applied
the additive preference relation and its definition is the
following one:
Definition 1 [3,9,30]: An additive reciprocal fuzzy pref-
erence relation R on a finite set of alternatives X is
a fuzzy relation in X × X with membership function
µR : X ×X → [0, 1], µR (xi, xj) = rij , verifying
rij + rji = 1 ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} .
When cardinality of X is small, the reciprocal fuzzy
preference relation may be conveniently denoted by the
matrix R = (rij) and the following interpretation is also
usually assumed:
– rij = 1 indicates the maximum degree of preference
for xi over xj .
– rij ∈ ]0.5, 1[ indicates a definite preference for xi
over xj .
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– rij = 0.5 indicates indifference between xi and xj .
– rij ∈ ]0, 0.5[ indicates a definite preference for xj
over xi.
Another important aspect related to GDM is opin-
ion aggregation in order to compute a global opinion
over a set of alternatives. Many operators have been
proposed to carry out this computation highlighting the
family of OWA operators.
In this section, the OWA[46], IOWA[49] and I-IOWA
operators are introduced [10].
Definition 2 An OWA operator of dimension n is a
mapping φ : Rn → R, which has an associated set of
weightsW = (w1, · · · , wn)T to it, such that wi ∈ [0, 1],
n∑
i=1
wi = 1,
φ(a) = φ(p1, · · · , pn) =
n∑
i=1
wipσ(i) (1)
and σ : {1, · · · , n} −→ {1, · · · , n} is a permutation func-
tion such that pσ(i) ≥ pσ(i+1), ∀i = 1, · · · , n− 1.
In order to obtain the associated weighting vector,
we use the method proposed by Yager [45,46] to give
semantic or meaning to weights by means of quantifier
guided aggregations. To implement the concept of fuzzy
majority in the aggregation phase, we use a fuzzy lin-
guistic quantifier [51], which indicates the proportion of
satisfied criteria “necessary for good solution” [47] (see
the appendix A for further details). In case of a regular
increasing monotone (RIM) quantifier Q, the weights
are computed using the expression [46]:
wi = Q
(
i
n
)
−Q
(
i− 1
n
)
, i = 1, . . . , n.
Mitchell and Estrakh in [27] described a modified
OWA operator in which the input arguments are not
re-arranged according to their values but rather us-
ing a function of the arguments. Inspired by this work,
Yager and Filev introduced in [49] a more general type
of OWA operator, which they named the Induced OWA
(IOWA) operator:
Definition 3 : An IOWA operator of dimension n is a
mapping ΦW : (R×R)n −→ R, which has an associated
set of weights W = (w1, · · · , wn) to it, so that wi ∈
[0, 1],
n∑
i=1
wi = 1,
ΦW (〈u1, p1〉, . . . , 〈un, pn〉) =
n∑
i=1
wipσ(i),
and σ : {1, . . . , n} −→ {1, . . . , n} is a permutation func-
tion such that uσ(i) ≥ uσ(i+1), ∀i = 1, . . . , n− 1.
In the above definition the reordering of the set of
values to aggregate, {p1, . . . , pn}, is induced by the re-
ordering of the set of values {u1, . . . , un} associated to
them, which is based upon their magnitude. Yager and
Filev called the vector of values (u1, . . . , un), the order
inducing vector and {p1, . . . , pn}, the values of the ar-
gument variable [49,50,48]. Thus, the main difference
between the OWA operator and the IOWA operator
is the reordering step of the argument variable. In the
case of OWA operator this reordering is based upon the
magnitude of the values to be aggregated, while in the
case of IOWA operator an order inducing vector is used
as the criterion to induce that reordering.
In many cases, each expert ek ∈ E is assigned an
importance degree uk to him/her, which without loss of
generality can be assumed to belong to the unit inter-
val, i.e. ui ∈ [0, 1] ∀i, and that there is some i such that
ui = 1. This can always be assured by taking the nor-
malised importance degrees that result when dividing
them by the maximum importance degree. Thus, im-
portance degree can be interpreted as a fuzzy set mem-
bership function, µI : E → [0, 1], in such a way that
µI(ek) = uk ∈ [0, 1] denotes the importance degree of
the opinion provided by the expert ek. In the area of
quantifier guided aggregations, Yager in [47] presents
a procedure to evaluate the overall satisfaction of Q
important criteria (experts) by an alternative x. In this
procedure, once the satisfaction values to be aggregated
have been ordered, the weighting vector associated to
an OWA operator using a linguistic quantifier Q is cal-
culated following the expression
wk = Q
(
S(k)
S(n)
)
−Q
(
S(k − 1)
S(n)
)
(2)
being S(k) =
∑k
l=1 uσ(l), and σ the permutation used
to produce the ordering of the values to be aggregated.
This approach for the inclusion of importance degrees
associates a zero weight to those experts with zero im-
portance degree. This procedure was extended by Yager
to the case of induced aggregation [48] and later by
Chiclana et al. [10] to introduce the Importance IOWA
(I-IOWA) operator. In this case, each component in the
aggregation consist of a tuple (uk, pk) where pk is the
argument value to aggregate and uk is the importance
weight value associated to pk and also the order induc-
ing value. This is summarised in the following defini-
tion:
Definition 4 Let E = {e1, . . . , em} be a set of experts
and U = (u1, . . . , um) ∈ [0, 1]n the vector of their as-
sociated importance degrees. An I-IOWA operator of
dimension n, ΦIW , is an IOWA operator whose order
inducing vector is the vector of importance degrees and
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following associated set of weights W = (w1, · · · , wn):
ΦIW (〈u1, p1〉, . . . , 〈un, pn〉) =
n∑
i=1
wipσ(i),
with
wk = Q
(
S(k)
S(n)
)
−Q
(
S(k − 1)
S(n)
)
, (3)
where S(k) =
∑k
l=1 uσ(l), and σ is the permutation such
that uσ(i) ≥ uσ(i+1), ∀i = 1, . . . , n− 1.
With the I-IOWA operator, we accomplish the selec-
tion phase. To do so, some authors [10] have proposed
the use of a quantifier-guided choice degree of alterna-
tives, a dominance degree. With this degree it is com-
puted the best acceptable alternative for the majority
(Q).
Definition 5 : The quantifier-guided dominance de-
gree, QGDDi, quantifies the dominance that one alter-
native has over all the others and is defined as follows:
QGDDi = φQ (p
c
i1, p
c
i2, . . . , p
c
in) .
So, for each alternative, xi, we obtain a value that
quantify the dominance that this alternative has over
all the others in a fuzzy majority sense.
With this degree we can sort out the alternatives
and choose the best one(s),
Xsol =
{
xi | xi ∈ X,QGDDi = sup
j
QGDDj
}
.
An example of how to use these operators in GDM
problems is shown in appendix B.
2.2 Consistency on Preference Relations
Although preference relations are one of the most used
preference structures, these also have some disadvan-
tages. First of all, the way of providing preferences lim-
its experts in their global perception of the alternatives
and as a consequence, the provided preferences could
be inconsistent.
In [8] the U-Consistency Method, useful to tackle
the problem of incomplete information in reciprocal
fuzzy preference relations, is presented. This method is
based on the modeling of consistency of preferences via
a self-dual almost continuous uninorm operator[7] and
computes the missing pairwise preference values from
the known ones with the aim of maintaining or max-
imising the expert’s global consistency. This process is
applied as well to complete preference relations as it
is our case. With this process, we can assure that the
values provided by the expert are compatible with the
rest of information and, moreover, we can replace those
ones that are not compatible with the estimated values.
In order to deal with the inconsistency, we must
understand that this representation assumes three fun-
damental and hierarchical levels of rationality:
– The first level of rationality requires indifference be-
tween any alternative xi and itself.
– The second one requires that if an expert prefers xi
to xj , that expert should not simultaneously prefer
xj to xi. This asymmetry condition is viewed as an
’obvious’ condition/criterion of consistency for pref-
erences. This rationality condition is modeled by the
property of reciprocity in the pairwise comparison
between any two alternatives, which is seen by Saaty
[36] as basic in making paired comparisons.
– Finally, the third one is associated with the transi-
tivity in the pairwise comparison among any three
alternatives.
A preference relation verifying the third level of ra-
tionality is usually called a consistency preference re-
lation and any property that guarantees the transitiv-
ity of the preferences is called a consistency property.
However, many properties or conditions have been sug-
gested in the literature of fuzzy preference to model
the third level of rationality. Among these properties
we can cite: (restricted) max-min transitivity, restricted
max-max transitivity, additive transitivity, multiplica-
tive transitivity [7,12,40], and we have used Tanino’s
multiplicative transitivity [40].
Next, we review some definitions to understand how
to improve the consistency of a relationship.
Definition 6 [7]: Let U be a representable uninorm
operator with strong negation N (x) = 1 − x and let
R be an additive reciprocal fuzzy preference relation
on a finite set of alternatives X, µR : X ×X → [0, 1],
where µR (xi, xj) = rij represents the preference degree
of the alternative xi over xj , then the fuzzy preference
relation R on a finite set of alternatives is consistent
with respect to U (U − Consistent) if
∀i, j, k : (rij , rkj) /∈ {(0, 1) , (1, 0)} ⇒ rij = U (rik, rkj) .
Tanino’s multiplicative transitivity property [40] un-
der reciprocity is the restriction to the region [0, 1] ×
[0, 1] \ {(0, 1) , (1, 0)} of the following well known and-
like representable uninorm [22]
U (x, y) =
{
0, (x, y) ∈ {(0, 1) , (1, 0)}
xy
xy+(1−x)(1−y) otherwise.
In order to improve the quality of the information
provided by the experts we use this transitivity. Given
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a fuzzy preference relation R and U a representable
uninorm (with N (X) = 1−x), the preference value rik
(i 6= k) is partially U-estimated using an intermediate
alternative xj such that (rij , rjk) /∈ {(0, 1) , (1, 0)} as
follows:
urjik = U (rij , rjk) .
The average of the partially U -estimated values ob-
tained using all possible intermediate alternatives can
be seen as the global consistency based estimated value
urik =
∑
j∈R01ik
urjik
#R01ij
,
where R01ik = {j 6= i, j |(rij , rjk) /∈ {(0, 1) , (1, 0)}} .
With this definition, we estimate the missing val-
ues of a relationship or as in our case to improve the
consistency of given relationship.
In our model, it is also very important to measure
the U-Consistency of a preference relation. A preference
relation is completely U-Consistency if urik agrees with
rik (urik = rik). However, experts are not always fully
consistent and because of this, it is possible to calculate
the difference between the actual value rik and the the
estimated one urik:
εurik = |urik − rik| .
From this formula, it is defined the U-Consistency level
associated with a preference value rik, and then, the
U -consistency level of the whole reciprocal fuzzy pref-
erence relation R.
Definition 7 [8]: Given U a representable uninorm with
N (x) = 1− x, the U -consistency level associated with
a preference value rik is defined as:
UCLik = 1− εurik,
Definition 8 [8]: Given U a representable uninorm with
N (x) = 1 − x, the U -consistency level of a fuzzy pref-
erence relation R measured in [0, 1] is given as follows:
UCLR =
∑n
i,j=1,i6=k UCLik
n (n− 1)
.
2.3 Social Influence Networks Theory
Social Influence Network Theory began with French’s
formal theory of social power [13] and it has been de-
veloped by several authors [14,15,17]. The aim of this
theory is to model the process of influence among ac-
tors belonging to the same social network. The follow-
ing expression is a recursive definition of the influence
process:
y(t) = AWy(t−1) + (I −A) y(1)
for t = 2, 3, . . . , where y(1) is an N × 1 vector of actors’
initial opinions on an issue, y(t) is an N × 1 vector of
actors’ opinions a time t,W = [wij ] is an N×N matrix
of interpersonal influences
(
0 ≤ wij ≤ 1,
∑N
j wij = 1
)
,
and A = diag (a11, a22, . . . , aNN ) is an N × N diag-
onal matrix of actors’ susceptibilities to interpersonal
influence on the issue (0 ≤ aii ≤ 1).
This model is defined from the following assump-
tions [15]:
1. Cognitive Weighted Averaging: Actors are assumed
to form their revised opinions through a weighted
averaging of influences on them. This influence is
not only exogenous because of the other actors’ opin-
ions, but also endogenous from their own initial opin-
ion. The relative weight of the endogenous and ex-
ogenous influences for each actor is determined by
A = [aii], the coefficients of susceptibility to social
influence.
2. Fixed Social Structure: The social structure of the
group of actors, the network, is represented by the
matrix W , is assumed to be fixed during the entire
process of opinion formation.
3. Determinism: Given the direct influence matrix W
and the group members’ initial opinion y(1), the sub-
sequent opinion changes in the group are completely
determined.
4. Continuance: The process of opinion formation in
the group continues until all changes of opinions
that may occur have played themselves out.
5. Decomposability: The opinion formation process can
be divided into time periods, defined by the times
t = 1, 2, 3, . . . , that may not be of the same length
in real time.
6. Simultaneity: In each time period, simultaneous lin-
ear equations yield an accurate prediction of all the
influence events that occur during that period.
If W is known, then A is computed as:
aii = 1− wii.
Assuming the process reaches an equilibrium, then
limt→∞ y
(t) = y(∞) = k <∞ and the original equation
becomes:
y(∞) = V y(1)
where V describes the total interpersonal effects that
transform initial opinions into final opinions. Then V is
calculated by using the following formula:
V = (I −AW )−1 (I −A) .
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3 Modeling Influence in Group Decision
Making
In order to model an influence network in a GDM pro-
cess, we propose to carry out the following phases:
1. Providing information: Experts’ opinions are pro-
vided by means of reciprocal fuzzy preference rela-
tions. However, as we said beforehand, one of the
disadvantages of this structure is that experts do
not always provide consistent assessments. Thus,
we need to improve the consistency of this infor-
mation by means of a U-Consistency Based Method
[8]. This method was originally presented to esti-
mate missing pairwise preference values, however,
this method is also used to improve the consistency
of a given relationship. Finally, we transform the
preference relation into utility vectors.
2. Modeling influence: In this phase we apply an influ-
ence model to estimate the evolution of the experts’
opinions with regards to the other experts’ opin-
ions. Experts are supposed to discuss their opinion
between them, depending on the influence between
them, their opinions are modified. In order to model
this, we use the model reviewed in section 2.3. In
this model, the influence between experts is mod-
eled by means of a social influence network. From
this model, and with the experts’ opinions, it is pos-
sible to infer the experts’ final opinions.
3. Obtaining the solution: Once that final opinions have
been calculated, the solution is computed. To do so,
experts’ utility vectors are aggregated by means of
an I-IOWA operator. The I-IOWA is a weighted ag-
gregation operator in which the information is ag-
gregate based on the importance of the information
sources. In our proposal, this importance is obtained
by computing the consistency of the information
that was initially provided by the experts. The more
consistent it is, the more important the information
is.
A representation of model’s phases can be seen in
Figure 1. In the following subsections we explain thor-
oughly these phases.
3.1 Providing the information
In this phase, a group of experts E = {e1, . . . , em}
provide their opinions about a set of alternatives X =
{x1, . . . , xn} by means of reciprocal preference relations.
The use of these representation provides some advan-
tages since they allow experts to focus exclusively on
two alternatives at a time.
Fig. 1 Model’s phases
Once we have the information, it is applied the con-
sistency model reviewed in section 2.2 in order to im-
prove the information provided by the experts.
Example 1 :
Let P1 be the opinion of the expert e1:
P1 =

0.5 0.4 0.6 0.9 0.7 0.8
0.6 0.5 0.7 1 0.8 0.9
0.4 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.7
0.1 0 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.4
0.3 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.6
0.2 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.5

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then the preference relation obtained after applying the
U -consistency method is:
P ′1 =

0.5 0.27 0.64 0.89 0.74 0.82
0.73 0.5 0.8 0.92 0.85 0.89
0.36 0.2 0.5 0.85 0.62 0.74
0.11 0.083 0.15 0.5 0.2 0.27
0.26 0.15 0.38 0.8 0.5 0.64
0.18 0.11 0.26 0.73 0.36 0.5
 .
Some of the obtained results are the following:
ur12 =
ur312 + ur
4
12 + ur
5
12 + ur
6
12
4
=
1.08
4
= 0.27.
ur13 =
ur213 + ur
4
13 + ur
5
13 + ur
6
13
4
=
2.56
4
= 0.64.
· · ·
ur65 =
ur165 + ur
2
65 + ur
3
65 + ur
4
65
4
=
1.44
4
= 0.36.
3.2 Modeling influence
Once experts’ opinions have been transformed, we model
the influence between experts. Experts are willing to
discuss their decisions with each other. Because of these
interactions, their opinions are influenced by other ex-
perts’ opinions and they also influence the other ones.
To apply the model summarized in section 2.3 we ac-
complish the following steps:
1. Transform the preference relationships into utility
vectors.
2. Apply the influence model for each experts’ opinion.
3.2.1 Transform the preference relations into utility
vectors
In order to carry out the next step, information must be
transformed into utility vectors firstly. To do so, we pro-
pose to use a quantifier-guided choice degree of alterna-
tives, a dominance degree, to compute the best accept-
able alternative for the majority (Q). The quantifier-
guided dominance degree QGDDi was reviewed in sec-
tion 2.1.
At the end of this step we have m utility vectors,
each one with the evaluation of the expert i of the n
alternatives
Ui =
 ui1· · ·
uin
 , i = 1, . . . ,m.
3.2.2 Apply the influence model for each experts’
opinion
In this step our aim is to model how the experts’ opin-
ions evolve by the interaction of each other. Experts
may differ in some of the opinions and it is expected
that they talk each other in order to clarify, defend and
modify their views.
As have been seen in section 2.3 we need to know
the experts’ initial opinions and the matrix W . The
influence model is applied on one alternative, however
in group decision making, experts provide their opinions
about a set of alternatives X = {x1, . . . , xn}. Therefore
we have to decompose it in n problems, each one for
each alternative.
First of all, we need to compute the matrix V as we
explained in section 2.3:
V = (I −AW )−1 (I −A) ,
and then, we apply the influence model for each alter-
native:
y(∞)xi = V y
(1)
xi , i = 1, . . . , n.
We must realize the representation of the informa-
tion used by the influence model is not the same as
the representation used by the experts to provide their
opinions. However, this information is easily transformed
since y(1)x1 is the initial opinion of all the experts regard-
ing the alternative x1, y
(1)
x2 is the initial opinion of all the
experts regarding the alternative x2 and so on. There-
fore, after transforming this information, we obtain:
y(1)xi =
 u1i· · ·
umi
 , i = 1, . . . , n.
Once we have applied the influence model, we obtain
the experts’ final opinions:
y(∞)xi =
 y(∞)1i· · ·
y
(∞)
mi
 , i = 1, . . . , n,
and we easily use this information to obtain the final
vectors U (∞)1 , · · · , U
(∞)
m :
U
(∞)
i =
 y(∞)i1· · ·
y
(∞)
in
 , i = 1, . . . ,m,
All these operations are described in depth in the
following example.
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Example 2 : Let E = {e1, e2, e3} be the group of ex-
perts and let X = {x1, x2, x3} be the group of alter-
natives. Experts express their assessment by means of
preference relations which have been transformed into
utility vectors:
U1 =
 0.30.4
0.1
 , · · · , U2 =
0.10.2
0.4
 , · · · , U3 =
 0.60.2
0.3
 .
In order to apply the influence model, the model is
applied to each alternative. In this example, we work
with alternative x1. First of all, it is obtained y
(1)
x1 from
the information provided by the experts:
y(1)x1 =
 0.30.1
0.6

where 1 is the initial period and 0.3, 0.1, and 0.6 are the
e1’s initial assessment, e2’s initial assessment, and e3’s
initial assessment about alternative x1 respectively.
Next we define the matrix that represents the inter-
personal influence of the group of experts (see Figure
2):
W =
 0.2 0.2 0.60.3 0.3 0.4
0 0.2 0.8
 .
The main diagonal of the matrix W , that is, wii,
represents the experts’ susceptibility to interpersonal
influence. For instance, if an expert has wii = 1 that
means that this person is not subjected to any inter-
personal influence. For example, w12 = 0.2 indicates
the direct relative influence of the expert 2 on expert 1
is 0.2.
Fig. 2 Graph representation of matrix W
Now we apply the model. First of all, we calculate
V and we obtain:
V =
0.25 0.09 0.660.07 0.41 0.52
0.00 0.02 0.98
 .
Matrix V represents the network influence on every
experts. It is very important to realize that V and W
are two different matrices and represent different aspect
of interpersonal influence among experts. W represents
the distribution of the direct relative interpersonal in-
fluence among experts. However, V , takes into account
all the flows of interpersonal influence, both direct and
indirect. For instance, v12 = 0.09 and that indicates
that the 9 percent of experts 1’s final opinion is deter-
mined by experts 2.
Now, if we apply the influence model:
y(∞)x1 = V y
(1)
x1
and we obtain the following solution for the alternative
x1:
y(∞)x1 =
 0.480.37
0.59
 .
Fig. 3 Evolution of the alternative x1
Looking the Figure 3 we can study the evolution of
alternative x1. So, the expert e1 starts with an assess-
ment of 0.3 about the alternative x1, experts e2 starts
with 0.1, and e3 with 0.6. The final experts’ opinions
are 0.48, 0.37, and 0.59 respectively. As can be seen,
the most influential expert is e3 whose opinion scarcely
changes, and on the other hand, experts e1 and e2 are
greatly affect by the opinion of e3 that is the reason
why their opinion change largely from 0.3 and 0.1 to
0.48 and 0.37 respectively.
3.3 Obtaining the solution
The aim of this final phase is to obtain the solution
of the GDM problem, i.e., a global utility vector that
provides us with an ordering vector of alternatives from
the best one to the worst one.
To obtain the solution, the utility vectors obtained
in the previous phase are aggregated by means of an I-
IOWA operator. This operator requires a vector of im-
portance degrees. In this model, it seems logical to use
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the experts’ consistency degree as the order inducing
values. We assume that experts who show more consis-
tency in their assessment are supposed to be more re-
liable, and therefore they should have a greater weight
in the aggregation.
In order to compute the experts’ consistency degree,
vectorWc, we use the U−consistency level for each ex-
perts’ preference relation by using the formula reviewed
in section 2.2:
Wc = (UCLP1 , · · · , UCLPm)
Where UCLPi is the U − consistency level of the pref-
erence relation Pi that has been provided by the expert
ei.
Once we have calculated this vector, we obtain the
final solution, Us, as follows:
Us = Φ
I
W
(
U
(∞)
1 , · · · , U (∞)m
)
=
 u1s· · ·
uns
 ,
where the best alternative has the greater value, and
worst one, the smaller one.
4 Example of Application of the Influence
Model in Group Decision Making
Let E = {e1, e2, e3, e4, e5, e6, e7.e8} be a set of eight
experts and six alternativesX = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6}.
To show the model, we carry the following phases.
Phase 1: Providing the information
There are eight experts: E = {e1, e2, e3, e4, e5, e6, e7, e8}
with their initial preference relations respective (see Ta-
ble 1),
Now we check the consistency and improve the qual-
ity of the information provided (see Table 2)
Phase 2: Modeling influence
Preference relations are transformed into utility vec-
tors. To do so, the dominance degree is computed. We
use the weighting vectorWOWA = (0.41, 0.17, 0.13, 0.11,
0.096, 0.087) calculated with the linguistic quantifier
“most of” defined by Q (r) = r1/2.
Finally, the utility vectors obtained from the pref-
erence relations are the followings:
Fig. 4 Matrix W of interpersonal influences
U1 =

0.74
0.84
0.66
0.31
0.58
0.49
 U2 =

0.84
0.66
0.58
0.74
0.31
0.49
 U3 =

0.61
0.48
0.86
0.81
0.7
0.27
 U4 =

0.46
0.84
0.58
0.31
0.77
0.66

U5 =

0.70
0.68
0.88
0.56
0.55
0.29
 U6 =

0.45
0.73
0.69
0.57
0.45
0.54
 U7 =

0.54
0.65
0.58
0.57
0.49
0.49
 U8 =

0.76
0.58
0.56
0.42
0.60
0.47
 .
Each expert is supposed to talk with each other.
Among them, there exists an influence network that
represents the degree in which one expert’s opinions is
influenced by the other ones. This influence network is
represented by the matrixW and graphically described
in Figure 4),
W =

0.2 0.1 0.25 0 0 0.15 0.3 0
0.1 0 0.18 0.05 0.34 0.24 0 0.09
0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0
0 0.1 0.23 0.34 0.14 0.09 0.1 0
0.2 0.08 0 0.021 0.05 0 0.049 0.6
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0.2 0.09 0.05 0.32 0.04 0 0 0.3
0 0.07 0.27 0 0.5 0.04 0 0.12

.
After applying the influence model, the utility vec-
tors obtained are the following:
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P1 =

0.50 0.40 0.60 0.90 0.70 0.80
0.60 0.50 0.70 1.00 0.80 0.90
0.40 0.30 0.50 0.80 0.60 0.70
0.10 0.00 0.20 0.50 0.30 0.40
0.30 0.20 0.40 0.70 0.50 0.60
0.20 0.10 0.30 0.60 0.40 0.50
 P2 =

0.50 0.70 0.80 0.60 1.00 0.90
0.30 0.50 0.60 0.40 0.80 0.70
0.20 0.40 0.50 0.30 0.70 0.60
0.40 0.60 0.70 0.50 0.90 0.80
0.00 0.20 0.30 0.10 0.50 0.40
0.10 0.30 0.40 0.20 0.60 0.50
 P3 =

0.50 0.69 0.12 0.20 0.36 0.90
0.31 0.50 0.06 0.10 0.20 0.80
0.88 0.94 0.50 0.64 0.80 0.98
0.80 0.90 0.36 0.50 0.69 0.97
0.64 0.80 0.20 0.31 0.50 0.94
0.10 0.20 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.50

P4 =

0.50 0.10 0.36 0.69 0.16 0.26
0.90 0.50 0.84 0.95 0.62 0.76
0.64 0.16 0.50 0.80 0.25 0.39
0.31 0.05 0.20 0.50 0.08 0.14
0.84 0.38 0.75 0.92 0.50 0.66
0.74 0.24 0.61 0.86 0.34 0.50
 P5 =

0.50 0.34 0.25 0.82 0.75 0.87
0.66 0.50 0.25 0.18 0.82 0.91
0.75 0.75 0.50 0.94 0.91 1.00
0.18 0.82 0.06 0.50 0.34 0.75
0.25 0.18 0.09 0.66 0.50 0.82
0.13 0.09 0.00 0.25 0.18 0.50
 P6 =

0.50 0.13 0.18 0.34 0.75 0.09
0.87 0.50 0.66 0.82 0.91 0.25
0.82 0.34 0.50 0.75 0.87 0.82
0.66 0.18 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.91
0.25 0.09 0.13 0.25 0.50 0.97
0.91 0.75 0.18 0.09 0.03 0.50

P7 =

0.50 0.55 0.45 0.25 0.70 0.30
0.45 0.50 0.70 0.85 0.40 0.80
0.55 0.30 0.50 0.65 0.70 0.60
0.75 0.15 0.35 0.50 0.95 0.60
0.30 0.60 0.30 0.05 0.50 0.85
0.70 0.20 0.40 0.40 0.15 0.50
 P8 =

0.50 0.70 0.75 0.95 0.60 0.85
0.30 0.50 0.55 0.80 0.40 0.65
0.25 0.45 0.50 0.70 0.60 0.45
0.05 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.85 0.40
0.40 0.60 0.40 0.15 0.50 0.75
0.15 0.35 0.55 0.60 0.25 0.50
 .
Table 1 Experts’ initial opinions
P ′1 =

0.50 0.27 0.64 0.89 0.74 0.82
0.73 0.50 0.80 0.92 0.85 0.89
0.36 0.20 0.50 0.85 0.62 0.74
0.11 0.08 0.15 0.50 0.20 0.27
0.26 0.15 0.38 0.80 0.50 0.64
0.18 0.11 0.26 0.73 0.36 0.50
 P ′2 =

0.50 0.80 0.85 0.73 0.92 0.89
0.20 0.50 0.62 0.36 0.85 0.74
0.15 0.38 0.50 0.26 0.80 0.64
0.27 0.64 0.74 0.50 0.89 0.82
0.08 0.15 0.20 0.11 0.50 0.27
0.11 0.26 0.36 0.18 0.73 0.50
 P ′3 =

0.50 0.69 0.13 0.20 0.36 0.89
0.31 0.50 0.06 0.10 0.20 0.78
0.87 0.94 0.50 0.63 0.79 0.98
0.80 0.90 0.37 0.50 0.69 0.97
0.64 0.80 0.21 0.31 0.50 0.94
0.11 0.22 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.50

P ′4 =

0.50 0.10 0.36 0.69 0.16 0.27
0.90 0.50 0.83 0.95 0.63 0.76
0.64 0.17 0.50 0.79 0.25 0.39
0.31 0.05 0.21 0.50 0.08 0.14
0.84 0.37 0.75 0.92 0.50 0.65
0.73 0.24 0.61 0.86 0.35 0.50
 P ′5 =

0.50 0.56 0.15 0.62 0.69 0.93
0.44 0.50 0.18 0.85 0.60 0.82
0.85 0.82 0.50 0.82 0.93 0.97
0.38 0.15 0.18 0.50 0.54 0.82
0.31 0.40 0.07 0.46 0.50 0.81
0.07 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.19 0.50
 P ′6 =

0.50 0.17 0.18 0.33 0.45 0.59
0.83 0.50 0.47 0.61 0.71 0.82
0.82 0.53 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.61
0.67 0.39 0.40 0.50 0.62 0.46
0.55 0.29 0.30 0.38 0.50 0.31
0.41 0.18 0.39 0.54 0.69 0.50

P ′7 =

0.50 0.30 0.40 0.45 0.51 0.66
0.70 0.50 0.53 0.45 0.73 0.68
0.60 0.47 0.50 0.40 0.54 0.66
0.55 0.55 0.60 0.50 0.44 0.60
0.49 0.27 0.46 0.56 0.50 0.37
0.34 0.32 0.34 0.40 0.63 0.50
 P ′8 =

0.50 0.75 0.75 0.72 0.77 0.82
0.25 0.50 0.55 0.62 0.59 0.65
0.25 0.45 0.50 0.60 0.46 0.67
0.28 0.38 0.40 0.50 0.20 0.44
0.23 0.41 0.54 0.80 0.50 0.50
0.18 0.35 0.33 0.56 0.50 0.50
 .
Table 2 Experts’ opinions more consistent
U ′1 =

0.60
0.69
0.72
0.53
0.61
0.45
 U ′2 =

0.56
0.65
0.73
0.58
0.60
0.45
 U ′3 =

0.58
0.56
0.80
0.70
0.70
0.35
 U ′4 =

0.52
0.72
0.67
0.48
0.69
0.53

U ′5 =

0.60
0.64
0.73
0.57
0.62
0.42
 U ′6 =

0.45
0.73
0.69
0.57
0.45
0.54
 U ′7 =

0.57
0.67
0.71
0.55
0.64
0.46
 U ′8 =

0.61
0.62
0.72
0.58
0.63
0.42
 .
Phase 3: Exploitation
In the final phase we aggregate the utility vectors
obtained in the previous step by means of an I-IOWA
operator. In order to accomplish this phase, we need to
compute vector Wc. This vector is computed from the
experts’ consistency degree and it is calculated as we
explained in section 2.2:
Wc = (0.94, 0.94, 0.99, 1, 0.86, 0.75, 0.76, 0.85) .
This vector is used as a weighting vector to compute
the solution.
The global opinion obtained after the aggregation
is:
Us =

0.53
0.68
0.71
0.57
0.57
0.48

From this vector, the order of the alternatives, from
the best one to worst one is:
{x3, x2, x4, x5, x1, x6} .
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5 Conclusion
In this proposal we have presented a novel approach
to model the experts’ interaction in a group decision
making problem.
GDM classical models do not take into account the
influence concept among experts to carry out the de-
cision making. However, in real group decision making
problems, the influence may play a key role to accom-
plish this task. For example, popular people in Social
Networks are known to be able to stablish trends or
styles.
The new model takes into account the relationship
among experts to create a social network. This social
network allows us to represent the experts’ social in-
fluence network. Moreover, because of the use of this
methodology, we can infer and study the evolution of
the experts’ opinions as well as predicting the solution
of the group decision making problem. In the future, we
will study a better representation for the experts’ so-
cial network to make easier its use. Besides, considering
that Social Networks have a very relevant role in many
areas of the modern society, this proposal could be very
useful to address real problems in which it is required
to predict the final result of a group decision making
problem from the people’s initial opinions without car-
rying out the GDM process. On the other hand, we also
want to study how modelling the influence in linguistic
contexts [24,44] and in heterogeneous decision making
frameworks [29,31].
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Appendix
A Fuzzy Quantifiers and Their Use To Model
Fuzzy Majority
Fuzzy majority is a soft majority concept expressed by a fuzzy
quantifier. This fuzzy quantifier is manipulated by means of a
fuzzy logic-based calculus of linguistically quantified propositions.
Hence, the use of fuzzy-majority-guided aggregation operators al-
lows us to incorporate the concept of majority into the computa-
tion of the solution.
Quantifier are used to represent the amount of items satisfy-
ing a given predicate. Classic logic is restricted to two quantifiers,
there exists and for all, however, human discourse is much richer
and more diverse. In order to provide a more flexible knowledge
representation tool, Zadeh introduced the concept of fuzzy quan-
tifiers [51].
Zadeh suggested that the semantics of a fuzzy quantifier can
be captured by using fuzzy subsets for its representation. More-
over, he differentiated between two types of fuzzy quantifiers:
absolute and relative ones. In this model, we have focused on rel-
ative quantifiers, such as most, at least half, etc., since they can
simbolize any quantifier of natural language. These quantifiers
can be represented by fuzzy subsets of the unit interval [0, 1]. For
any r ∈ [0, 1], Q (r) indicates the degree in which the proportion
r is compatible with the meaning of the quantifier it represents.
A relative quantifier Q : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] satisfies
Q (0) = 0 ∃r ∈ [0, 1] such that Q (r) = 1
In [47], Yager identified two categories of relative quantifiers: RIM
quantifiers such as all, most, many, at least α; and regular de-
creasing monotone (RDM) quantifiers such as at most one, few,
at most α, being the former one, the category used in this pro-
posal.
A RIM quantifier satisfies
∀a, b if a > b then Q (a) ≥ Q (b) .
Yager in [47] considers the parameterized family of RIM quan-
tifiers
Q (r) = rα, α ≥ 0
When this family of RIM quantifiers is used with OWA and IOWA
operators, α < 1 in order to associate high weighting values with
high consistent ones. In particular, in this paper, we use the RIM
function Q (r) = r1/2.
B Example of Group Decision Making
Let E = {e1, e2, e3, e4} be the group of four experts and X =
{x1, x2, x3, x4} be the set of four alternatives. This group of
experts, E, express their preferences about the set of alterna-
tives, X, by means of fuzzy preference relations, {P1, P2, P3, P4},
Pk =
[
pkij
]
, pkij ∈ [0, 1], which are additive reciprocal.
Consider the following preferences over the set of alternatives
X:
P1 =

0.5 0.3 0.7 0.1
0.7 0.5 0.6 0.6
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.2
0.9 0.4 0.8 0.5
P2 =

0.5 0.4 0.6 0.2
0.6 0.5 0.7 0.4
0.4 0.3 0.5 0.1
0.8 0.6 0.9 0.5

P3 =

0.5 0.5 0.7 0
0.5 0.5 0.8 0.4
0.3 0.2 0.5 0.2
1 0.6 0.8 0.5
P4 =

0.5 0.4 0.7 0.8
0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3
0.3 0.6 0.5 0.1
0.2 0.7 0.9 0.5
 ,
12 Luis G. Pérez et al.
and their respective expert’s importance I = {0.75, 1, 0.5, 0.25}.
We use the fuzzy linguistic quantifier ’most of’ defined by
Q (r) = r1/2 [47], with its corresponding weighting vector W =
(0.5, 0.21, 0.16, 0.13). By using the I-IOWA operator, the follow-
ing collective preference relation is computed:
Pc =

0.5 0.4 0.65 0.23
0.6 0.5 0.65 0.43
0.35 0.35 0.5 0.14
0.77 0.57 0.86 0.5
 .
Now, if we use the quantifier-guided dominance degree, QGDDi
with the weighting vector WQGDD = (0.5, 0.21, 0.16, 0.13), the
following utility vector is obtained:
Uc =

0.52
0.59
0.4
0.75
 ,
and therefore the final solution is:
(x4, x2, x1, x3) ,
i.e. x4 is the preferred alternative, x2 is the second one, etc.
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